Formal Games as Probing Tools for Investigating Behavior Motivated by Trust and Suspicion by Rapoport, Anatol
Formal Games as Probing Tools for Investigating
Behavior Motivated by Trust and Suspicion
ANATOL RAPOPORT
Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan 
Every technology derives support from
four sources: first, a group of sciences which
nurture its inventions; second, a group of
techniques, the arts of the technology; third,
a social organization which makes possible
the implementation of the technology; and
finally, an ethos which justifies its practices
and its aims.
To take some obvious examples, modern
industrial technology derives from physical
science, from techniques of mass produc-
tion, from certain forms of social organiza-
tion (e.g., capitalist or socialist), and from
an ethos which declares that affluence is
preferable to poverty and that man is privi-
leged to modify nature to suit himself.
Modern medical technology derives from
physical and biological sciences, from cer-
tain organizational techniques (e.g., man-
agement of hospitals), from the same forms
of social organization, and from an ethos
which declares that human life is to be pro-
longed under almost any circumstances.
Military technology derives from similar
scientific and social sources and from an
ethos which declares that people may be
killed on a mass scale in order to enhance
the power and prestige of national states
or in order to preserve forms of social
organization.
The development of a technology obvi-
ously depends on the ways its various
sources of support interact with each other
and with it. In all the examples so far
mentioned, a sort of positive feedback has
been operating to enhance an accelerating
growth of each. It happens at times, how-
ever, that the interaction is of an inhibitive
kind which ultimately destroys the technol-
ogy. An example, which anthropologists are
fond of quoting, is that of a certain South
Pacific people who had developed an excel-
lent canoe-building technology but along with
it a set of rituals so complex that in time
no canoe could be built without violating
one of innumerable taboos with its concom-
itant danger of disaster. Consequently
canoe-building was abandoned. It seems,
then, that this technology carried within its
behavioral by-product the seeds of its own
destruction.
Strategy and its Paradoxes 
’
Those of us who hope to see military
technology ultimately wither and die derive
some comfort from certain indications that
it, too, carries within itself the seed of its
own destruction. Some of these indications
are obvious. If modern military technology
is put to full use, it will destroy the industrial
civilization which nurtures it and so will
destroy itself. The comfort to be derived
from this prospect is small. However, there
is another, brighter prospect. The nemesis
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of military technology may come from
within itself, namely, from one of its princi-
pal nurturing sciences-the science of strat-
egy.
In its most immediate application, that is,
in actual combat, this science is called &dquo;tac-
tics&dquo; and purports to embody the principles
governing the development and use of war
materiel in battle. The aims of strategy,
however, reach much farther than the battle-
field. Strategy purports also to embody the
principles governing the use of battles (or
their avoidance) in the prosecution of a
war. Indeed, the scope of strategy in the
last century or two has been still further
broadened to include principles governing
the use of war to prosecute national policy.
It would seem, therefore, that strategy, if it
lays claim to scientific status, should include
in its scope not only such military subjects
as tactics and logistics but also, in its more
recent political context, economics, politics,
geopolitics, sociology, etc.
Quite recently, war has become so un-
comfortably dangerous, even for the global
strategists, that it has become unrealistic to
view war as Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Bis-
marck once viewed it, namely, as a conven-
ient instrument of national policy. The talk
nowadays revolves less around war itself
and more around the threat of nuclear war
as an instrument of national policy. Now
threat is a psychological term, and having
admitted such a term into its lexicon, the
practitioners of strategy are obliged to throw
an acknowledging nod to psychology.
It would be comforting for the strategists
to enlist psychology in the service of war
technology, and this can be done to a degree.
The human psyche is tractable. Where some
people exercise power over others, psycho-
logical know-how comes in handy for elicit-
ing conforming behavior. But techniques of
propaganda, indoctrination, and brainwash-
ing, while possibly useful in handling the
living war material, are only peripheral to
the central problem of strategy: the knowl-
edge and, preferably, control of the psychic
processes of those over whom one does not
have power: the enemy.
Indeed, why should not psychology serve
the strategists, if psychology purports to be
a science of the psyche, and if everyone,
including the enemy, has a psyche? I believe
that the major block to an effective utiliza-
tion of psychological knowledge in the ser-
vice of strategy, as it applies to global con-
flict, is the ethos which underlies war
technology and its supporting science. The
ethos which underlies the practice of any
science or technology, as we have seen,
must justify the practice. Accordingly, the
ethos which underlies the strategy of global
conflict must justify the conflict. It is the
ethos which assumes that, at least under
certain circumstances, global conflict, in-
cluding nuclear war, is justifiable. Spelled
out, this is at times taken to mean (on our
side) that nuclear war is preferable to the
withdrawal of Western occupation troops
from West Berlin or to the appearance of a
Communist state in Latin America. The
assignment of these preferences is usually
justified on ideological grounds, often con-
veniently lumped into such a slogan as
&dquo;Better dead than red.&dquo; Now it seems to
me that an ethos which hides behind slogans
will not stand up under psychological scru-
tiny, and for this reason, the practitioners of
global strategy, if they wish to continue to
practice their trade, must resist attempts to
bring to bear psychological science on their
problems.
Not only must the psychological validity
of the better-dead-than-red axiom remain
unquestioned in strategic circles, but also its
relevance must remain unexamined. For
the most part, global strategy, in order to be
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taken seriously, must remain abstracted from
real global issues. If issues are to be men-
tioned at all, they must be strategic issues,
not substantive ones. The prizes of global
strategy are simply strategic advantages, and
the grand prize is something called &dquo;victory,&dquo;
which, according to Herman Kahn, can
always be unambiguously defined. The vic-
tor, writes Kahn, is, by definition, the one
who writes the peace treaty, much as the
victor in a game of chess is the player who
is entitled to say &dquo;checkmate.&dquo;
It appears, therefore, that the paradigm
of contemporary diplomatic-military policy
is a vast game of strategy. In such a game,
each decision can, in principle, be rational-
ized by the strategic advantage it confers.
Each strategic advantage can, in turn, be
rationalized in terms of its contribution to
the probability of victory. But victory itself
is not rationalizable. It is not legitimate to
ask of what use is victory. To ask this
question is to threaten the game itself and
the raison d’être of the science of strategy.
But such questions cannot be avoided if
psychology is seriously to be brought into
the picture. I believe this explains the strik-
ing psychological paucity of modern stra-
tegic theory.
In the context of the zero-sum game, to
be sure, there is no need for psychology.
Homo economicus, the mannikin invented
hy classical economics, the creature pos-
sessed by a single faculty, namely, greed,
suffices as the model of the &dquo;rational
player.&dquo; His single tropism can well be built
into a computer. His &dquo;rationality&dquo; is cal-
culating ability. Since the theory of the two-
person, zero-sum game is complete, a com-
puter can, in principle, be preprogrammed
’ 
to play any such game.
The Breakdown of Strategic Rationality
in Non-Zero-Sum Games
The situation changes radically, however,
when we enter the realm of the non-zero-
sum games. Thomas C. Schelling was one
of the first students of strategy to point out
the peculiar psychological problems which
lurk in non-zero-sum games and which are
neglected in formal game theory. A very
elementary example will illustrate the type
of problem. Suppose a dollar is to be di-
vided between two people as follows. Each
writes down independently of the other how
much of the dollar he wants. If the sum
of the two amounts does not exceed a dollar,
each gets what he has asked for; otherwise
the dollar is forfeited.
Schelling argues that each player should
claim 50¢. His argument is intuitively justi-
fiable and, incidentally, experimental evi-
dence corroborates the expectation. This is
one example of what Schelling calls the
&dquo;prominent solution.&dquo; An important goal in
this game is to avoid the region in the game
matrix where the sums exceed a dollar.
Each player, being aware of this common
interest, can contribute to the probability of
avoiding the bad region by keeping his
claim in the dollar low. He hopes the other
is doing the same. On this assumption it is
safe to claim 50¢, but not more, because
each perceives that the other feels &dquo;safe&dquo;
in claiming 50Ø and thus cannot be counted
on to claim less.
Let us examine the matrix (Figure 1) of
this game. For simplicity, the amounts to
be claimed have been confined to 250, 50¢,
and 75¢. The outcome (50, 50) is seen to
be an equilibrium point, in the sense that
neither player can independently depart from
it without worsening his pay-off.
Let us now modify this game by chang-
ing just two entries, as shown in Figure
2. The equilibrium (50, 50) has now
been destroyed, because now either player
can improve his pay-off by moving away
from the erstwhile equilibrium in one of the
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FIG. 1. FIG. 2.
Columns and rows represent the respective claims of the players. The first of each pair of
entries is the pay-off to the row player; the second, to the column player.
two directions. The most interesting feature
of this game is that if both players pursue
this course, both lose. An interesting psy-
chological question is whether, in a situation
of this sort, people will be deterred from
seeking the additional advantage which mov-
ing away from equilibrium seems to confer.
The game shown in Figure 2 has another
interesting feature. If one of the players has
reason to suppose that the other will claim
75~, he has a choice of three policies: he
can stay with 50¢, he can follow suit with
a counterclaim of 750, or he can &dquo;retreat&dquo; to
25~. Oviously, in view of the resulting pay-
offs, retreat is best, counterclaim is next
best, and standing pat is worst. However,
we have considered only the money pay-offs.
We do not know what other pay-offs may
be psychologically relevant. Retreat saves
some of the money but, in some people’s
estimation, is hard on self-esteem, and, in
repeated plays, may encourage further &dquo;ag-
gression.&dquo; The counterclaim is harder on
the pocketbook but affords the satisfaction
(for some people) of &dquo;punishing the aggres-
sor.&dquo; Staying with 50~ and thus taking a
loss of 25~ is the choice most difficult to
defend, because this choice seems to encour-
age the opponent to make the large claim
and at the same time involves a loss for
self. But its value as a message is not to be
underestimated. In sticking to 50¢, the
player is letting the other know that he is
firmly adhering to the principle of equity,
neither retreating nor taking revenge but
inviting the other to return to the social
optimum (50, 50). It is a bid to call
the conscience of the other into play.
All these are psychological, not game-
theoretical, considerations. To be sure, it
is an assumption of game theory that in
principle all outcomes, together with their
psychological overtones, are translatable into
utility units. The idea is that, after such a
translation has been made, the decision
problem has been reduced to a game-theoret-
ical one. But it is one thing to assume that
something can be done &dquo;in principle&dquo; and
quite another to do it. Morever, even if
utilities are definitely assigned, many non-
zero-sum games do not have any intuitively
acceptable solutions. The best known and
simplest example of such a game is Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, which we obtain if we de-
lete the first row and the first column from
the game shown in Figure 2, thus cutting
off the &dquo;retreat&dquo; allowed in that game. An
example of Prisoner’s Dilemma is shown in
Figure 3. We relabel the strategies C and D
(for cooperation and defection). Strategy
D dominates C for both players (i.e., C is
best against either of the other’s strategies).
Yet the outcome DD is worse for both than
the outcome CC.
I submit that these features of non-zero-
sum games are quite suggestive of the sort
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FIG. 3. Prisoner’s Dilemma.
of dilemma which plagues international di-
plomacy and even military strategy of our
day. I have also maintained that the ration-
ales for decisions in those fields either make
little or no use of psychology or, worse, use
bad psychology-bad in the sense that the
psychology which is used is more appropri-
ate to &dquo;rational players&dquo; of classical (zero-
sum) game theory than to human beings.
However, the &dquo;rational player&dquo; psychology
is, for the most part, inadequate in interna-
tional affairs because the zero-sum-game
models, often tacitly assumed to represent
the issues, are grossly inadequate.
On the other hand, psychology cannot be
avoided even in the oversimplified frame-
work of present day diplo-military strategy,
which depends so vitally on the credibility
and effectiveness of threats.
An Experimental Approach
If psychological knowledge is to be used
effectively in the guidance of policies and
decisions, such knowledge must first be ob-
tained. It cannot be obtained easily from
actual experience in the world of diplo-mili-
tary strategy because of the involvements of
the participants, because of the complexities
of the situation, because of the lack of op-
portunities to experiment or to conduct long-
range observations, etc. We are thus reduced
to the necessity of simulating the situations
in the laboratory.
Now there are two ways of simulating a
situation: one is by reproducing the features
of its content; the other by trying to capture
its psychological essentials. The first seems
to have the advantage of realism. One can,
perhaps, view such simulation as a replica
of the real state of affairs reduced in scale.
The second has the advantage of simplicity
and flexibility. The second method has one
decided shortcoming. No extrapolation of
the results obtained from it to any real situ-
ation can be seriously defended. But this
is the case of every experiment in vitro.
Extrapolations of the results to the situation
in vivo are never safe. The limitation applies
also to all &dquo;realistic&dquo; simulations, whether
of a Strategic Air Command operations cen-
ter or of the international game of nuclear
diplomacy.
It goes without saying that proposals to
learn about pertinent psychological processes
from simulations, mock-ups, and games do
not constitute proposals to rely on the find-
ings in making decisions. The most one can
expect from simulations is hints on what
sort of psychological processes may be per-
tinent. The hope is that, in the light of these
hints, the psychological problem lurking in
diplo-military strategy might be reexamined.
If only this could be accomplished, the
laboratory procedures would already be
strongly justified. The enemies of military
technology hope for even more. They hope
that the necessity of obtaining psychological
knowledge will force the decision-makers to
study psychology seriously, and that knowl-
edge so obtained will reveal to them the
folly of relying on military technology. In
this way, the military complex may yet de-
stroy itself before it destroys the rest of our
civilization.
Of the two methods of laboratory ap-
proach, namely, realistic simulation and ab-
stract formulation, we have chosen the lat-
ter. Some of the reasons for the choice have
already been mentioned, namely, simplicity
and flexibility of the procedures and theo-
retical tractability of the results. One other
reason for our preference must be men-
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FIG. 4. Pay-off matrices.
tioned. It was our hope that abstractly for-
mulated decision situations, deliberately
separated from diplo-military content,
would tap more basic psychological proces-
ses than realistic simulations. In a realistic
simulation, a &dquo;player&dquo; might, for example,
happily initiate a nuclear strike, because
he knows it is only a game. Or, on the con-
trary, he might fail to initiate it (where a
real decision-maker would), because the
pressures operating on the latter cannot be
reproduced in the laboratory. In an abstract
game, only the structure of the game oper-
ates on the personality and on the motiva-
tion of the players. The trimming away of
all the nonspecific components of conflict
of interest contributes, one hopes, to bringing
out the psychological essentials of such
conflicts.
Our experiments, accordingly, were with
games of the sort already mentioned, specif-
ically, with the simplest of these, namely,
the Prisoner’s Dilemma type. We used, for
the most part, seven of these games. The
pay-off matrices are shown in Figure 4.
Our subjects were University of Michigan
students. Each pair of subjects was used in
only one experimental session, which con-
sisted, in various experiments, of 300-700
consecutive plays of one or several games
with communication between the players
disallowed. The pay-offs were in money,
one mill per point.
A Summary of Experimental Results
So far we have conducted about 200 such
experimental sessions, and our data consist
of nearly 100,000 responses. Because of the
great number of responses, rather stable
statistical results have been obtained, which
enable us to answer a number of questions
about the behavior of university students in
this situation. There is not time to describe
in detail the experimental conditions, the
results, or the mathematical models designed
to describe the fundamentally stochastic
process which underlies this form of inter-
action. I will conclude by listing the ques-
tions that can now be answered on the basis
of the data so far gathered and analyzed.
I will leave it to others to judge the psycho-
logical meaning of the answers, their import,
and their possible relevance to the problems
of arms control and disarmament. Only
with regard to the last question will the
connection between the answer and such
problems be explicitly pointed out.
Qi. What is the typical first response in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma game? (Note that
purely strategic considerations dictate the
response DD. Collective interest consider-
ations dictate the response CC, but no
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possibility for coordinating the latter re-
sponse exists.)
Ai. The first response is practically random,
as evidenced by the nearly equal propor-
tions of CC, CD, DC, and DD responses.
These proportions do not vary significantly
in the seven games we have used.
Q2. What happens thereafter in the short
run?
A2. The immediate trend which sets in is a
decrease of C (the percentage of coopera-
tive responses) shown by the decrease of
a running average of C over ten consecu-
tive plays. The extent of this decrease
is such that the average C response over
the first fifty plays is reduced from about
50 per cent to about 40 per cent.
Q3. What happens in the long run?
A3. After about fifty plays, the frequency
of C responses averaged over the entire
population of players steadily rises. This
effect was not observed by earlier investi-
gators who confined themselves to about
thirty to fifty plays of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The asymptotic value of C for the popu-
lation is about 65 per cent.
Q4. Is this asymptotic value also modal, i.e.,
characteristic of most of the player pairs
in the population?
A4. No. The modal frequencies are at the
extremes. Most pairs either lock in on
CC, i.e., achieve a tacit collusion to co-
operate or, on the contrary, lock in on
DD, giving up the possibility of achieving
the biggest joint pay-off. The 65 per cent
is only the average of a strongly bimodal
distribution.
Q,,. Are the responses of the two members
of a pair typically interdependent?
A6. Definitely yes. Note that there are three
possible answers to this question: ( 1 )
The responses of one player tend to elicit
like responses on the part of the other.
(2) The responses are independent. (3)
The responses of one player tend to elicit
unlike responses in the other. All three
possible answers can be rationalized in
plausible terms. The first can be ration-
alized on the grounds of mutually stimu-
lating attitudes-cooperation breeds co-
operation and vice versa; the second, on
the grounds of absence of explicit com-
munication ; the third, on the grounds that
the biggest pay-offs come from respond-
ing noncooperatively to the other’s co-
operation.
If we assign the value 1 to each indi-
vidual C response and 0 to each indi-
vidual D response, the correlation
coefficient of a run of paired re-
sponses will be positive if like elicits like,
negative in the opposite case, and zero if
the responses are independent. Empiri-
cally, we find this correlation coefficient
distributed around the values of +0.5 to
+0.6, indicating that the interdependence
is of the first kind, i.e., that like responses
are elicited more frequently than unlike
ones.
Qg. Is there other evidence of interdepen-
dency ?
A6- If we plot the probability of a CC re-
sponse against the number of consecutive
CC responses which have preceded it, we
find that following a non-CC response the
probability of a CC response (i.e., its
&dquo;spontaneous&dquo; probability) is about 0.07
(averaged over the whole population of
responses). On the other hand, following
a single (first) CC response, the proba-
bility that the next one is also CC is about
0.60. Thereafter this probability continues
to rise steadily with the number of con-
secutive CC responses which have already
occurred, until the asymptotic value of
about 0.95 is achieved. The situation is
quite similar with the DD responses. A
spontaneous DD response (i.e., following
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a non-DD one) is comparatively rare with
frequency of occurrence of about 0.10.
Following a single DD response, the prob-
ability that the next one is also DD is 0.67.
The probability keeps increasing with in-
creasing number of previous consecutive
DD responses until an asymptotic value of
about 0.9 is reached.
These contingent probabilities consti-
tute the most direct evidence of the &dquo;lock-
ing in&dquo; effect. Typically, a pair gravitates
toward either CC or DD, and the proba-
bility of persisting in either state becomes
the greater the longer the state has already
persisted.
Note that this effect cannot be ex-
plained as a case of simple operant con-
ditioning involving a selection of rewarded
responses and elimination of punished
ones. There are pressures against the
persistence of either of the two states, CC
and DD. The latter is directly punishing,
while the former is associated with a
temptation to defect in the hope of getting
the biggest pay-off. The pressure against
persisting in the unilateral cooperative
states (CD or DC) is even greater, be-
cause these states are the most punishing
for the unilateral cooperator. Nevertheless,
there is evidence that these states also
tend to persist, at least for a while.
Q7. Is the behavior of player pairs different
in games with different pay-offs?
A7- Yes. Each of our games can be de-
scribed by three parameters, representing
(1) reward for cooperation, (2) tempta-
tion to defect, and (3) punishment for
defection. We find that, if temptation
and punishment are kept constant, C in-
creases with reward; if reward and punish-
ment are kept constant, C decreases with
increasing temptation; if reward and
temptation are kept constant, C increases
with punishment, as one would expect.
Comparing Games 1 and 2 and Games 11 I
and 12 (cf. Figure 4) we see that rewards
for cooperation are more effective in elic-
iting cooperation than numerically equal
punishments for noncooperation (tempta-
tion being constant).
The differentiation of behavior in the
different games is sharpest when each
pair plays only one game 300 times in
succession (as against other conditions
when several games are scheduled in the
same experimental run). Apparently
when the same pair plays different games,
the games &dquo;contaminate&dquo; each other. The
games which ordinarily show a high degree
of cooperation show a lower degree and
vice versa.
Q8. Aside from the persistence of CC and
DD responses, are the other unilateral
responses, CD and DC, equally persistent?
A8. These tend to die out in the course of
an experimental session. But long runs of
unilateral responses (in exceptional cases,
thirty to fifty) are at times observed.
They can be naturally attributed to the
attempts of one player to get the other to
cooperate. We call such runs &dquo;martyr
runs,&dquo; because they are punishing to the
well-intentioned player.
Q9. How do martyr runs typically end?
Ag. We have compared the relative frequen-
cies of CC and DD responses following a
martyr run. We arbitrarily count three
successive CC responses following a
martyr run of at least three plays as a
&dquo;conversion,&dquo; while three consecutive
DD’s are counted as a &dquo;failure,&dquo; i.e.,
the martyr gives up the attempt. Prelimi-
nary indications are that failures outnum-
ber conversions about two and one-half to
one.’ One must remember, however, that
an experimental session often includes
1 Reversals also occur, that is, a conversion
sometimes coincides with the martyr’s giving up.
578
several such attempts, of which the last
frequently succeeds. The fact remains
that, in about one-half of all cases, an ex-
perimental session ends in a long run of
cooperation.
Qio. How are the lengths of the various runs
distributed?
Alo. There is at least one noteworthy feature
about these distributions. If we count all
the runs of responses where CC does not
occur (so-called conflict runs), we find
that the proportion of such runs which
&dquo; 
have not yet been terminated at time t
(measured by the number of responses)
is equal to e -avt, where a is a parameter
of the distribution.
Now very similar distributions are ob-
served in the durations of strikes and of
wars. One can interpret this result in two
ways. One can assume that a general &dquo;law&dquo;
is operating in the dynamics of conflicts
which can be stated in qualitative terms thus:
the longer a conflict lasts the harder it is to
settle it. This is in view of the fact that the
exponent of the decay rate is &dquo;weaker&dquo; than
a linear function of time, which would be
the case if the probability of termination of
a conflict were independent of its duration.
There is also another interpretation. Since
our conflict runs were taken from a whole
population of pairs, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that the propensity for ending a con-
flict run is distributed in some fashion in
the population of pairs. It turns out that, if
this distribution is approximately logarithmic
normal (like many distributions of param-
eters which take only positive values),
then the observed rate of decay of the con-
flict runs would be just what we find it.2
Conceivably we can make a tentative de-
cision in favor of one or the other hypothe-
sis if we examine the distribution of runs of
single pairs of subjects, thus avoiding the
variation of the assumed &dquo;propensity to
terminate conflict runs.&dquo; If indeed the ob-
served distribution of lengths of runs owes
its form to the propensity distribution, then
the distribution of lengths of runs in the re-
sponses of single pairs ought to be simply
decaying exponentials (with different decay
constants for different pairs) rather than the
square-root exponentials which we observe
in the whole population. Since the number
of runs of a single pair is much smaller than
in the whole population, the decision of
whether the distribution is fitted better by
an ordinary exponential or by a square-root
exponential can be made only on the basis
of a refined statistical analysis. This has not
yet been done. The question of whether our
data reveal something about the dynamics
of conflicts or only something about the
distribution in the population of a propensity
to end a &dquo;conflict run&dquo; therefore remains
open.
Now we come to the finding which per-
haps has more direct bearing on arms control
and disarmament. We ask what the proba-
bility is of ending a CC run. Recall that
a pressure to end such a run is always
present in the form of the temptation
to defect. This temptation is tempered by
the fear of punishment associated with DD,
for it is natural to expect that defection will
elicit retaliation and so the punishing state
DD. If now we hold the numerical value of
the punishment constant, how will the fre-
quency of defections from the CC state be
related to the size of the temptation?
Common sense would suggest that the re-
lation would be a monotone one: the greater
the temptation (other things being equal),
the more probable the defection ought to be.
Indeed, this argument is sometimes used to
2 Strictly speaking, the distribution of pro-
pensities ought to be the inverse Laplace trans-
form of e-a&radic;t, which is of the form ae-a2/4k/2&radic;&pi;k3
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suggest that a high level of armaments,
properly controlled, makes for a more stable
international situation than the state of dis-
armament, since the temptation to resume
the arms race is so much stronger in the
disarmed state. When everyone is disarmed,
only a slight accumulation of, say, nuclear
weapons makes a decisive difference in the
balance of power, while in a highly armed,
balanced state the discrepancy must be
considerably higher in order to upset the
balance.
We examine the probability of defecting
from the CC state, once it has been achieved,
in Games 1, 3, and 5. As can be seen from
the matrix (cf. Figure 4), the punishment is
the same in all three games. But the tempta-
tion is lowest in Game 1 and highest in
Game 5. According to the common-sense
hypothesis, then, on which the arms control
argument also rests, defections from the CC
state ought to be most frequent in Game 5
and least frequent in Game 1. Our data
show that the probability of defection from
CC is indeed lowest in Game 1. But it is
considerably lower in Game 5 (the large-
temptation game) than in Game 3 (the
medium-temptation game). The respective
probabilities of defection are 0.03, 0.12, and
0.05. Again there are two possible explana-
tions. One is the natural selection principle.
The pairs which achieved cooperation in the
game with the highest temptation, namely, 5,
are likely to be the pairs with the highest pro-
pensity for cooperation. Therefore they de-
fect less often than the average pairs. The
other explanation is that the achieving of
cooperation in Game 5 is so difficult that,
once it has been achieved, there is a strong
reluctance to break the tacit agreement. If
this is true, it has a bearing on the psychology
of a disarmed world. Again we are not yet
in a position to decide between the hypothe-
ses (if, indeed, either is relevant). But the
possibility that some such psychological
forces may be operating is certainly not ex-
cluded.
Concluding Remarks _
It behooves us, I think, to pay attention
to such psychological considerations when
we analyze the world situation with a view
of weighing the various proposals aimed at
minimizing the danger of war. It is unfortu-
nate that so much ingenuity is directed at
the invention of elaborate mechanical safe-
guards and at purely strategic analyses, and
so little effort is undertaken with a view
toward understanding what makes people be-
have as they do. The strategists tend to for-
get that decision-makers are human beings,
often, alas, an all-too-understandable mis-
take, but nevertheless a dangerous one. If a
trivial game for pennies turns out to be such
a rich source of information, revealing intri-
cate and stable patterns of human behavior
in mixed-motive situations, how much more
there is to learn in real life. Let us never
forget that the most important question re-
mains unanswered-a question of supreme
importance to us as human beings. How did
we get into this bind, where the most un-
speakable crimes against humanity are not
only thinkable but are actually the subject
of an on-going serious discussion? What we
ought to do is find out how to make the un-
speakable unthinkable and to keep it so.
This task involves not something that one
does with hardware nor something that one
calculates on a computer. It involves the
acquisition of substantive knowledge of the
human psyche.
The laboratory experiments yielding &dquo;hard
data,&dquo; such as those we have described,
should not be considered as sources of real
knowledge about the human psyche but only
as pointers to a tortuous road toward such
knowledge.
